Conflicts and Security Risks of Climate

Change in the Mediterranean Region by Goffredo, Stefano
The Mediterranean Sea
Stefano Go redo · Zvy Dubinsky 
Editors
Its history and present challenges
625S. Goffredo and Z. Dubinsky (eds.), The Mediterranean Sea: Its history and present challenges, 
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6704-1_39, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
 Introduction 
 Climate change poses a signifi cant challenge for the 
Mediterranean region (Southern Europe, North Africa, and 
Middle East), affecting both environmental and anthropo-
genic systems and their interaction. 1 According to the fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC  2007a ) the physical effects of cli-
mate change include rising temperature and declining pre-
cipitation, exacerbating existing pressures on limited water 
resources. Heat waves and forest fi res compromise vegeta-
tion cover and add to existing environmental problems. 
Ecosystem change affects soil quality and moisture, the car-
bon cycle and local climate. These factors add to existing 
problems of desertifi cation, water scarcity, and food produc-
tion (Giannakopoulos et al.  2009 ; Stern et al.  2006 ; IPCC 
 2007b ; Brauch et al.  2003 ), having adverse impacts on 
agricultural and forestry yields. Population pressure and 
water-intensive activities such as irrigation already impose 
stress on water supplies, posing dangers to human health, 
ecosystems and national economies of countries. Projected 
sea-level rise affects low lying and densely populated coastal 
regions. Declining reserves of oil and gas will place addi-
tional stress on the economy. 
 With various impacts interconnected and contributing 
to vulnerability, in the long run, the whole Mediterranean 
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the fi ve North African countries. Brauch ( 2012 ) offers detailed analysis 
also on the Balkans and the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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region could become a hotspot of global warming. Parti cular 
severe impacts are projected for the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), where the combination of climate change, 
environmental degradation, water scarcity, food insecurity, 
population growth, economic, and societal instability could 
contribute to security risks and confl icts in the region. The 
complex interactions between global climate change and 
regional impacts do not respect the natural boundaries in the 
Mediterranean and require an integrated and interdisci-
plinary perspective of natural and social phenomena. 
 Starting from a description of the physical effects of cli-
mate change on the Mediterranean, this article offers an 
overview of the vulnerability to climatic changes and looks 
at various dimensions relevant to climate change in the 
Mediterranean region, including water, food, migration and 
energy. This analysis allows us to identify hotspots which are 
particularly vulnerable to climate change and discuss secu-
rity concerns of climate change. Finally, we investigate pol-
icy responses and institutional frameworks for adaptation, 
confl ict resolution and cooperation. 
 Projections and Impacts of Future Climate 
Change in the Mediterranean 
 The Mediterranean climate of southern Europe and the 
coastal areas of North Africa are affected by hot, dry sum-
mers and cooler, wetter weather in winter. The MENA area 
away from the coast is characterized by a hot, dry desert 
climate. The AR4 (IPCC  2007a ,  b ) offered no specifi c 
assessment on the Mediterranean region but provided results 
for Southern Europe, North Africa and West Asia that are 
relevant for the Mediterranean. The projections for tempera-
ture change in the region differ widely, depending on the 
assumptions of the global circulation models assessed by 
the IPCC. 
 Temperature Change 
 According to model calculations based on the A1B scenario, 
a temperature rise of 2.2–5.1 °C (mean 3.4 °C) in the 
Mediterranean area is likely by 2100 compared to the base-
line period of 1980–1999 (IPCC  2007a ). The greatest warm-
ing and temperature fl uctuations are expected to occur in 
summer while temperature variability in winter will be 
smaller (Giorgi and Bi  2005 ). The IPCC Synthesis report 
( 2007a ) concluded that “in southern Europe, climate change 
is projected to worsen conditions (high temperatures and 
drought) in a region already vulnerable to climate variabil-
ity”. This report noted that Africa will be most severely 
affected “because of low adaptive capacity and projected cli-
mate change impacts”. 
 More specifi c observations and projections of climate 
change in the Mediterranean are given in other studies. The 
UNEP-MAP report of 2009 noted that “over the twentieth 
century and with a clear acceleration since 1970, South- 
Western Europe (the Iberian Peninsula, South of France) 
recorded an increase in temperature of almost 2 °C. The 
same increase can also be noticed for the North of Africa … 
The rise in temperature is more marked in winter than in 
summer and for the minimum rather than the maximum fi g-
ures.” Regarding future trends, the UNEP-MAP report 
claimed (p.22): 
 “By the end of the century, the average annual temperature 
increase is likely to be between 2.2 and 5.1 °C for 2080–
2099, compared with 1980–1999. The probability of tem-
peratures rising by between 3 and 4 °C is estimated at 50 %. 
The expected rise in surface temperature varies from one 
region to the next – in the Sub-Saharan regions it could well 
be as much as 4 °C in summer. On the other hand, on the 
Northern shores, the rise is likely to be more marked in win-
ter, at around 3 °C. … The greatest rises in temperature … 
are likely to be recorded in the Mashreq (Palestinian 
Territories, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq). Higher tem-
peratures should thus produce summers with an increasing 
number of very hot days.” 
 Based on IPCC ( 2007a ) fi ndings, the AFED Report 
(Abou and Ayman  2009 ) noted that by the end of the 
twenty-fi rst century, the Arab region will face an increase 
of 2–5.5 °C in the surface temperature. This increase will 
be coupled with a projected decrease in precipitation up to 
20 %. These changes will lead to shorter winters and dryer 
summers, hotter summers, more frequent heat wave occur-
rence, and more variability and extreme weather events 
occurrence. 2 
 For all North African countries the trend of increasing 
annual mean temperatures that has been observed for the 
second half of the twentieth century in North Africa is likely 
to continue and to cause warmer and drier conditions (for an 
overview of climatic conditions and trends in Northern 
Africa, see  Schilling et al.  2012 ). Future projections point to 
an increasing temperature, between 2 and 3 °C by 2050 
under A1B scenario conditions (Paeth et al.  2009 ). The tem-
perature assessment indicates increases of mean temperature 
in all months of the year, with largest warming rates in sum-
mer (June/July) and autumn (Oct./Nov.) of partly more than 
4 °C until the end of the twenty-fi rst century (Hertig and 
Jacobeit  2008a ,  b ,  2010 ). Worst case scenarios assume a very 
strong warming of about 6 °C over north-western Africa in 
the twenty-fi rst century compared to the twentieth century 
(Patricola and Cook ( 2010 ). Future projections of climate 
change for Africa show considerable uncertainties (including 
2 
 This section is based on Brauch ( 2012 ) where many additional refer-
ences can be found, especially on the debate in Arab countries. 
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the possibility of the greening of the Sahara, Claussen et al. 
 2003 ). The IPCC concludes that it is necessary to improve 
the assessments for the African regions, including specifi c 
feedback mechanisms such as the oceans and of land use 
change. 
 Changes in Precipitation 
 The IPCC Synthesis Report ( 2007a ) observed that from 
1900 to 2005 “precipitation declined in the Sahel, the 
Mediterranean, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia”. 
Winter precipitation has declined in the Mediterranean 
region since the middle of last century (WBGU  2008 ), a 
trend that has been ascribed to the North Atlantic Oscillation 
(Xoplaki et al.  2004 ). For the future the greatest decline in 
precipitation is anticipated in summer. Precipitation will 
likely fall by 4–27 % in southern Europe and by 20 % in 
North Africa on average by end of the century (WBGU 
 2008 ; Brauch  2007 ). Changes in precipitation and tempera-
ture lead to changes in runoff and water availability that is 
projected to “decrease by 10–30 % over some dry regions at 
mid- latitudes and dry tropics, due to decreases in rainfall 
and higher rates of evapotranspiration. There is also high 
confi dence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. the Mediterranean 
Basin, western United States, southern Africa and north-
eastern Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due 
to climate change” (IPCC  2007a ). 
 Climate change will affect “Mediterranean-type ecosys-
tems because of reduction in rainfall; and tropical rainforests 
where precipitation declines.” The UNEP-MAP ( 2009 ) 
report noted that “rainfall … has … diminished in Southern 
Europe. In the Mediterranean, some regions to the south 
have recorded a 20 % drop in rainfall. The trend is less even 
as far as North Africa is concerned.” According to a precipi-
tation trend analysis by the  Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research (PIK) for 1975–2004, precipitation dropped 
between 0–20 % in South France and in the mountainous 
regions of Central Italy they rose by 10 %. But in North Italy 
precipitation dropped by 20–40 %, along the Ligurian coast 
by 20–30 % and in South Spain up to 20 %. 
 According to the scenarios of the Acacia project the pre-
cipitation in South Europe will decline until 2020 in sum-
mer in parts of Central Spain by 13–14 % and in the 
Northern part of Greece by 10 %. Up to 2050 the projected 
precipitation in summer will drop in Greece by 14–20 %, in 
South France by 13–15 % and along the Spanish 
Mediterranean coast by 21–23 %. By the year 2080 the 
decline in summer precipitation in Greece will be between 
18–27 %, in South France between 17–20 % and in Spain 
between 27–42 %. The A-2 scenario of the Acacia project 
projected a decline of summer precipitation for Spain 
amounting to 51–73 % and to Greece by 41–52 %. For parts 
of the Atlas mountain region in North Africa precipitation 
may decline in summer by 20–25 % until 2020, by 31–49 % 
until 2050 and by 47–75 % until 2090. The precipitation 
trend maps of PIK for 1975–2004 indicated an increase 
between 0–30 % for the Moroccan Atlantic coast and in the 
Northwest of Egypt by 10–20 %. However, according to 
these data, precipitation declined along the Moroccan and 
Algerian coast by 0–30 % and in Tunisia and Libya by 
20–40 %. 3 
 Only in two countries a reduction in precipitation was 
already observed while the other three experienced no 
change. Climate change studies indicate a decline in pre-
cipitation in all of North Africa during the twenty-fi rst cen-
tury (Schilling et al.  2012 ), and precipitation in North 
Africa is likely to decrease between 10 and 20 % until the 
year 2050 under SRES A1B scenario conditions (Paeth 
et al.  2009 ). A more detailed analysis shows decreased 
rainfall and drier conditions in spring (April/May), precipi-
tation reductions at the beginning of the rainy season in 
October/November, substantial increases in high winter 
(December/January) and more intense precipitation events 
(Christoph et al.  2010 ). 
 In the north-western parts of northern Africa observed 
changes point towards warmer and drier conditions in the last 
decades, with signifi cant reduction in precipitation. For north-
eastern Morocco and north-western Algeria, several studies 
indicate below average annual rainfall rates since about the 
mid-1970s (Hertig and Jacobeit  2008a ,  b ). Moroccan rainfall 
might be reduced in the period 2011–2050 between 5 % 
(mountainous areas) and 30 % in the southern regions for the 
SRES A1B scenario and by 5 and 20 % for the B1 scenario 
(Christoph et al.  2010 ). No pronounced precipitation trends 
have been observed for the eastern regions such as north-
eastern Algeria, Mediterranean Tunisia, central Tunisia, and 
the Mediterranean parts of Libya and Egypt during the last 
decades of the twentieth century (Schilling et al.  2012 ). 
 Extreme Weather Events and Hazards 
 The projected increase in the number and intensity of natural 
hazards (IPCC  2007a ,  2012 ) due to anthropogenic climate 
change often coincides with an increase in environmental 
stress due to the scarcity and degradation of water and soil 
resulting from rapid population growth and the overuse of 
these environmental resources. Due to the difference in 
social vulnerability between Southern Europe and MENA, 
3 
 The data by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Change Impact Research 
(PIK) were made available H.G. Brauch in summer 2006 as background 
information for the preparation of the expert study for the WBGU; see 
Brauch ( 2007 ,  2010 ). 
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the number of persons affected has been much higher in 
North Africa and in the Eastern Mediterranean (Guha-Sapir 
and Vos  2011 ). 
 Extreme weather events have severely affected the 
Mediterranean region that has been confronted with drought 
throughout history. When the precipitation comes in 
autumn, it is often connected to intensive fl ash fl oods that 
cause a high number of casualties and affect people and 
economic damages in many MENA countries due to the 
higher degree of social vulnerability (Brauch  2003 ). Both 
on the global and regional Mediterranean level an increase 
of the number and intensity of natural hazards has been 
projected that may affect “many cities and industrial regions 
in coastal zones”. An indicator of potential impacts has 
been the heat wave of August 2003 when between 35,000 
and up to more than 70,000 people died in Central and 
Southern Europe. 
 According to the IPCC ( 2007a ) “Negative impacts will 
include increased risk of inland fl ash fl oods and more fre-
quent coastal fl ooding and increased erosion (due to stormi-
ness and sea level rise).” By the 2080s, many millions more 
people than today are projected to experience fl oods every 
year due to sea level rise. The numbers affected will be larg-
est in the densely populated and low-lying megadeltas of 
Asia and Africa while small islands are especially vulnerable 
( very high confi dence ). 
 In Northern Africa, the risk of extreme events, in par-
ticular droughts, is likely to increase (Schilling et al.  2012 ). 
In Europe and western North Africa average precipitation 
reduction is associated with a reduced number of precipi-
tation days (Räisänen et al.  2004 ). For the future a signifi -
cant prolongation of very long dry spells is expected by 
end of the century (Voss et al.  2002 ) and considerable drying 
over western Mediterranean and North Africa (Beniston 
et al.  2007 ). 
 Projected Sea-Level Rise 
 The projections on the average sea-level rise have been 
disputed in the preparation of the IPCC’s AR4 which could 
only agree on an average increase during the twenty-fi rst 
century of 18–59 cm. Rahmstorf ( 2007 ,  2009 ) referred to 
recent studies of an observed average increase of the sea 
level by 1.6 mm/year between 1961 and 2003 and 2.5 mm/
year between 2003 and 2008. According to the A1B scenario 
in the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) 
by the mid-2090s, global sea level reaches 0.22 to 0.44 m 
above 1990 levels, and is rising at about 4 mm/yr (IPCC 
 2007a ). Towards the end of the twenty-fi rst century, pro-
jected sea level rise will affect low-lying coastal areas with 
large populations. The cost of adaptation could amount to at 
least 5–10 % of GDP (IPCC  2007a ). 
 Impact of Climate Change on Water Supply 
and Water-Related Confl icts 
 Water Scarcity and Confl ict 
in the Mediterranean 
 Water is the resource most directly and strongly affected by 
climatic change, and the MENA region is already one of the 
regions with high water scarcity and severe droughts. Higher 
soil water evaporation exacerbates summer water shortages, 
and river water levels are higher in winter and lower in sum-
mer when need is greatest. Higher temperatures and less 
(reliable) precipitations will likely decrease overall water 
availability. Increasing water scarcity has negative impact on 
agricultural and forestry yields and on hydropower. Increased 
risk of fi res in droughts will compromise vegetation cover 
(from forest to bush and patchy cover). The North African 
countries are either termed water stressed or water scarce, 
with Algeria and Tunisia facing the highest level of water 
scarcity while in Egypt and Morocco water is less scarce 
(Schilling et al.  2012 ). The dependency on water and its 
importance for the economy is particularly high in Morocco. 
 Water has traditionally been a strategic issue in the Middle 
East, closely interconnected with the region’s deeply rooted 
confl icts. The arid climate, the imbalance between water 
demand and supply, and the on-going confrontation between 
key political actors exacerbate the water crisis. Since much 
of the water resources are trans-boundary, water disputes 
often coincide with land disputes. Competition over utilizing 
shared resources has been observed for the rivers Nile, 
Euphrates, Tigris and Jordan. Most intense confl icts occurred 
among the co-riparians of the Jordan River basin where the 
available water resources are not shared in an equitable man-
ner (Dombrowsky  2003 ; Selby  2009 ; Salem  2011 ). 
 Although water scarcity sometimes contributed to tensions, 
statements on ‘water wars’ remained exaggerated. So far there 
have been no interstate wars over water but rather water coop-
eration and numerous agreements (for a survey, see Biswas 
 1994 ; Wolf  1998 ; Amery and Wolf  2000 ; Shuval and Dweik 
 2007 ). Confl icts are largely determined by deep political dif-
ferences (in particular, between Israel and the Palestinians), 
where hydrological matters represent an additional dimension 
that contributes to social instability, ethnic clashes or border 
disputes (Messerschmidt  2012 ). Hydrological issues have 
been treated in all major agreements, including the bilateral 
Peace Treaty of October 1994 which lists a series of common 
water projects. The conditions for cooperative solutions may 
decline due to persistent population growth, over-exploitation 
and pollution. 
 Global warming is projected to increase the likelihood and 
intensity of droughts in the region. Water shortages in summer 
are already widespread in many countries of southern Europe 
J. Scheffran and H.G. Brauch
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and North Africa. With higher temperatures the evaporation 
rate of water in the soil will increase and in rivers the seasonal 
differences in water fl ows are becoming bigger, adding to the 
water problems in summer, when demand for water is great-
est. In Southern Europe, a temperature rise of 2 °C could 
decrease summer water availability by 20–30 %; a rise of 4 °C 
by 40–50 % (Stern et al.  2006 ). Decreasing water availability 
has multiple effects, including negative impacts on agricul-
tural and forestry yields and on the generation of hydro elec-
tricity (IPCC  2007b ). 
 Due to projected population growth and precipitation 
decline, the access to safe drinking water and to green water for 
agriculture will further worsen. “This dynamic”, the WBGU 
( 2008 ) argues “triggers distributional confl icts and poses major 
challenges to water management systems in the countries 
concerned”. In the MENA region “the countries which will 
suffer the greatest water stress are generally those which 
already lack the political and institutional framework necessary 
for the adaptation of water and crisis management systems. 
This could overstretch existing confl ict resolution mechanisms, 
ultimately leading to destabilization and violence”. 
 The Case of the Nile River Basin 
 Reduced water supply over an extended period bears a con-
fl ict potential among the countries in the Nile River basin 
(Peichert  2003 ; Mason  2004 ; Mason et al.  2009 ; Piontek 
 2010 ; Link et al.  2012 ). With nearly 6,700 km the Nile is the 
world’s longest river and fl ows through ten countries, feed-
ing its water into the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The drain-
age basin comprises approximately one tenth the size of 
Africa and more than one fi fth of the African population 
lives within the river basin. 
 The growing population in the riparian countries increases 
the pressure on the Nile River water resources. Water supply 
into the tributaries of the Blue and While Nile shows large 
fl uctuations which poses a problem for the production of 
hydroelectric power. Considerable evaporation in the swamps 
of southern Sudan decreases the available water further 
downstream. The future development of the overall water 
supply in the Nile River basin is highly uncertain, and its water 
resources are sensitive to changes in climatic conditions 
(Beyene et al.  2010 ; Conway et al.  2007 ). There has been 
only little climate modelling on the Nile Basin, especially on 
the precipitation in the upstream countries (Buontempo et al. 
 2011 ). Large-scale simulations for a doubling of atmospheric 
CO 2 show large variations in future river fl ows which could 
range from a 30 % increase to a 77 % decrease (Strzepek 
et al.  1996 ). 
 Large variability and reduced water supply over an 
extended period bear a confl ict potential among the countries 
in the Nile basin which have great discrepancies in economic 
power, individual welfare and societal stability (Piontek 
 2010 ; Link et al.  2012 ). While the water supply is greatest in 
the upstream countries which mainly consist of grassland 
and shrubland, especially in Ethiopia, the demand for water 
is largest in the downstream countries Egypt and Sudan 
where most of the arable land is in the direct vicinity of the 
river. Since many of the upstream countries are among the 
countries most sensitive to hunger, they have growing needs 
for water to overcome this situation. Egypt depends on the 
Nile for 95 % of its drinking and industrial water and thus is 
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. If 
Egypt feels threatened by increasing water demands of 
upstream countries, it could be tempted to use its hegemonic 
power, aggravating the chances for political crisis and violent 
clashes (Piontek  2010 ; Link et al.  2012 ). Lack of usable land 
and water resources may add to impoverishment and migra-
tion from rural areas to cities. Cairo’s infrastructure is already 
under pressure due to its rapid growth which endangers 
water availability, hygiene, waste disposal, and housing. 
Climate change is likely to worsen existing problems. 
 Due to temperature rise, the agriculturally productive Nile 
river delta is at risk from sea-level rise and salinization in the 
Mediterranean Sea which may affect between two and four 
million Egyptians (FoEME  2007 ) many of whom could seek 
refuge in Cairo’s suburbs. In the Nile delta, “an increase of 
50 cm would imply that the salty water would intrude about 
9 km into coastal aquifers” (Sherif and Singh  1999 ; WBGU 
 2006 ). Without protective countermeasures a sea-level rise 
of 50 cm would affect in the administrative districts of 
Alexandria and Port Said about “1.5 million people” (El 
Raey  1991 ,  2011 ; Brauch  2002a ). 
 If disputes can be resolved, joint management schemes 
can strengthen cooperation as countries increasingly work 
together to allocate resources to the greatest possible benefi t 
of all. One way is to establish formal agreements to manage 
the water resources. Egypt currently uses most of the water 
according to prevailing agreements (Nile Waters Agreement 
of 1929, agreement between Egypt and Sudan of 1959) 
which are not recognized by the upstream riparians since 
they were not involved. A possible way out of the water cri-
sis is to increase the effi ciency of water use, reallocate water 
to other sectors than agriculture and share waste resources in 
a fair way (Mason  2004 ). The Nile Basin Initiative can pro-
vide a framework to resolve crises cooperatively. 
 Consequences for Food Security 
 Even without climate change the food situation is already 
critical in the Mediterranean region. The overuse and decline 
of water and soil resources, with the additional pressure from 
climate change, has detrimental effects on food security. A 
major problem is salinization which may result from drought 
and an increase in irrigation. The degradation of ecosystems 
further affects soil quality and moisture, carbon cycle and 
39 Confl icts and Security Risks of Climate Change in the Mediterranean Region
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local climate. Self-reinforcing consequences are lower air 
humidity and less precipitation. If this trend continues it can 
lead to desertifi cation, with land then being lost for agricul-
tural use. These developments are a growing problem in 
parts of Southern Europe, for instance, soils in large areas of 
Spain and some regions of Italy and Greece are already sali-
nized. Particularly vulnerable are countries with a resource- 
intensive agriculture, such as Greece where 7–8 % of GDP 
depend on agriculture. 
 The situation is much more critical in North Africa due to 
a combination of factors (see the overview in Schilling et al. 
 2012 ): The agricultural land is limited by the Sahara, in 
Egypt to 2.6 %, in Libya to 1.2 %, in Tunisia to 10.0 %, in 
Algeria to 3 % and in Morocco to 20 % of land area (Galil 
 2011 ). Morocco has about 8.4 million ha agricultural land, 
Algeria more than 7.5 million ha and Tunisia more than 4.6 
million ha. The areas suitable for agriculture are already 
largely exploited. Water scarcity strongly affects the agricul-
tural sector which in all North African countries is by far the 
largest consumer of water (mostly above 80 %). Except from 
Egypt’s agricultural sector which depends on the Nile, all 
other countries in North Africa rely almost entirely on pre-
cipitation for agriculture (Schilling et al.  2012 ). It is esti-
mated that wheat and maize production in Egypt could 
signifi cantly drop by middle of the twenty-fi rst century. 
 Rapid population growth (see section “ Population and 
migration in the mediterranean ”) and human activities, such as 
deforestation, land clearance, overgrazing and non- sustainable 
irrigation, put the soils under serious stress. The risk of wide-
spread soil salinization is increasing, leading to the loss of pas-
ture and arable land. The overuse of the land as a consequence 
of the intensifi cation of agricultural methods has eroded the 
soils (Chourou  2011 ; Galil  2011 ). The rising evapotranspira-
tion will contribute in most cases to crop yield declines. For 
instance, in Morocco between 1987 and 1991, the cropland 
increased from 4.4 to 5.4 million ha primarily by extending to 
marginal rangeland which contributed to overgrazing in poorer 
land and soil erosion. The importance of the agricultural sector 
for the economy varies strongly among the considered states. 
In all countries the contribution of agriculture to GDP is less 
than 20 %, reaching the highest level in Morocco (17 %). A 
large population is directly employed in agriculture, reaching 
more than 30 % of the labour force in Egypt (in 2001) and 
more than 40 % in Morocco (in 2006) (CIA  2010 ). 
 Since agricultural productivity is very sensitive to changes 
in temperature and precipitation, for a global temperature 
rise of 2–4 °C a drop in agricultural productivity is expected. 
Growing aridity and reduced agricultural yields will likely 
affect food security in the Mediterranean region, particularly 
in North Africa where climate change adds pressure to cur-
rent non-sustainable land uses. Surface run-off will fall sig-
nifi cantly by 2050, and the risk of desertifi cation will increase 
in all countries, in particular in the northern Sahara. The 
IPCC ( 2007b ) estimates that in North Africa due to climate 
change agricultural production will decline by 0.4–1.3 % of 
GDP by 2100. For Algeria and Morocco a decrease in pro-
ductivity of more than one third is projected without carbon 
fertilization (Schilling et al.  2012 ). Altogether climate 
change will diminish availability, accessibility, stability and 
utilization of food. This was assessed in the most recent 
National Communications (NCs) to the UNFCCC. 4 
 Despite agricultural policies the goal for self-suffi ciency 
in food remained unachievable due to a continued high popu-
lation growth and environmental problems. Self-suffi ciency 
has been rather declining in the past fi ve decades and will 
continue to decline by mid-century, increasing the need in 
food imports (Alexandratos  1995 ,  2003 ). In consequence, 
food prices may rise further as will be fi nancial resources 
needed to pay for these imports. All MENA countries must 
spend more for importing cereals and making potable water 
available to their people, to tourists and for irrigation. Due to 
declining oil revenues there will be less income to invest into 
food imports. These factors together “may trigger regional 
food crises and further undermine the economic performance 
of weak and unstable states, thereby encouraging or exacer-
bating destabilization, the collapse of social systems, and 
violent confl icts” (Bruinsma  2003 ). 
 While the North may adapt to declining precipitation 
more easily with a slightly growing population, for the coun-
tries on the southern and eastern shore declining precipita-
tion will require major efforts that affect the water available 
for irrigation and food production (Hayek and Al Hmoud 
 2011 ; Haddad  2011 ; Issar  2011 ). Self-suffi ciency in cereals 
will drop in MENA countries and the need for food imports 
or ‘virtual water’ (Allan  2003 ) will rise. In reaction to a 
region-wide economic crisis in the mid-1980s Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia launched agricultural reforms to reduce 
food imports and subsidies that contributed to foreign debt. 
 Population and Migration 
in the Mediterranean 
 Population and Demographic Trends 
in North Africa 
 Demographic trends aggravate the physical effects of cli-
mate change in the MENA region. The strong population 
growth and urbanization is increasing the demand for water 
and food on the national and regional scale.
•  From 1950 to 2010, the population of 11 MENA coun-
tries grew from 72,512,000 to 280,411,000 (UNDP  2011 ) 
4 
 See the NCs of Non-Annex 1 Mediterranean countries at:  http://
unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2979.php 
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and is projected to grow by an additional 111,169,000 
people from 2010 to 2050, reaching about 370,352,000 
people by 2100, based on the medium projection of the 
UN Population Division of May 2011. Population growth 
is especially signifi cant in North African countries, where 
the population has increased from 43.8 million in 1950 to 
165.4 million in 2010 and it is projected to reach 230.6 
million by 2050, with a drop to 215.2 million by 2100 due 
to the process of demographic transition. The population 
is increasingly concentrated in large cities and along 
the coast. 
•  The urbanization trends between Southern Europe and 
North Africa have differed between 1950 and 2010. While 
in Southern Europe the relative urban population is pro-
jected to grow and the rural population will decline until 
2050, in North Africa the rural population will stabilize 
while nearly all projected population growth will be in 
cities that are projected to grow from 107.3 million in 
2010 to 223.3 million in 2050 (UNDP  2010 ; Brauch 
 2012 ). This rapid and often chaotic urbanization has 
resulted in mega cities (Brauch  2011 ) where the people 
are highly socially vulnerable to natural hazards. These 
population growth and urbanization trends pose different 
demands for water and food. 
•  Population in coastal cities of the Mediterranean region 
has grown between 1950 and 2000 from 25 to 70 million 
and it has been projected to rise up to 90 million by 2025. 
In southern Europe the coastal population doubled 
between 1950 and 2000 from 20 to 40 million, and it will 
probably stabilize at this level by 2030, while it is pro-
jected to rise in the MENA region from 40 to 50 million 
between the year 2000 and 2030. This will most seriously 
affect the deltas of the major rivers, most particularly the 
Nile Delta (Brauch  2002a ). The UNEP-MAP report 
( 2009 ) noted based on satellite monitoring “between 
January 1993 and June 2006 … an obvious east–west dif-
ferentiation, with a clear trend towards a sea level rise in 
the Eastern Mediterranean”. 
•  The recent Human Development Index (HDI) in 2011 
was lowest for Morocco (place 130), for Egypt (113), 
Algeria (96), Tunisia (94) and highest for Libya (64). On 
the Southern shores of the Mediterranean income per 
capita is far less than on the Northern shores, e.g. the 
income between Spain and Morocco in 2009 GDP/cap 
was 32,150 (PPP $) for Spain and 4,494 (PPP $) for 
Morocco (UNDP  2011 ). 
 Impact of Climate Change on Migration 
 The discrepancies in income and development between 
Southern Europe and the MENA countries are a major driver 
for people to migrate across the Mediterranean Sea. With a 
rising warming, it may be increasingly diffi cult to sustain the 
living standards and provide development opportunities for a 
growing population in the Mediterranean region. Lack of 
usable land and water resources adds to impoverishment and 
forces people to move from rural areas to cities, or to go 
abroad. North Africa is both a destination and transit region 
for migrants. Population pressures are amplifi ed by migra-
tion from the Sahel region. 
 Water scarcity and lower agricultural productivity may 
add to migration pressure from the rural areas to urban cen-
tres like Cairo and contribute to degradation of sanitary con-
ditions and increasing social unrest as well. Changes in 
environmental conditions have an infl uence on water and 
land availability, which in turn affects economic production. 
Since human welfare and societal stability depend on wealth, 
a deterioration of the economy has negative implications on 
society as well. Together with the continuing demographic 
pressure, this may intensify competition over remaining ara-
ble land and increase the pressure to migrate. Most of the 
transboundary environmental migration prevails as south- 
south migration. 
 Since the fourth assessment report of the IPCC ( 2007a , 
 b ), the link between climate change, security and migration 
has raised increasing attention in public statements and the 
research literature which identifi es environmental migration 
as a potential security problem (Gemenne et al.  2011 ). 
According to WBGU ( 2008 ), “the increase in drought, soil 
degradation and growing water scarcity in combination with 
high population growth, unstable institutions, poverty or a 
high level of dependency on agriculture means that there is a 
particularly signifi cant risk of environmental migration 
occurring and increasing in scale”. In this view, migration of 
a large number of people could potentially increase the like-
lihood of confl ict in transit and target regions because envi-
ronmental migrants compete with the resident population for 
scarce resources such as farmland, housing, water, employ-
ment, and basic social services; in certain cases they may 
upset the regional “ethnic balance” (Reuveny  2007 ). 
 Estimating the number of climate-induced migrants is a 
controversial subject. For some researchers, the number of 
“climate refugees” will dramatically rise, up to several hun-
dred millions globally (Myers  2002 ). These numbers have 
been questioned as speculative and exaggerated, lacking jus-
tifi cation and empirical evidence (Jakobeit and Methmann 
 2012 ; Oels  2012 ). Globally, regionally and in host countries 
there are no reliable international statistics on environmen-
tally and climate-induced migration as environmental factors 
do not entitle the refugee status. A comprehensive study 
(Black et al.  2011 ) shows that migration has to be considered 
as a multicausal and complex process that precludes isolat-
ing environmental factors from other migration drivers. 
Going beyond the threat-victim dichotomy, migrants are 
seen as active social agents that shape and create their 
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livelihood under changing environmental conditions and fi nd 
collective responses to the climate challenge that maintain 
community resilience. Remittances and other resources from 
migrants can contribute to climate adaptation in their home 
countries (Scheffran et al.  2012a ). 
 In European policy debates migration has been described 
as an increasing security challenge. In this view, both push 
and pull factors increase the migration pressure from some 
MENA countries to Europe, but also to the Arab Gulf, North 
America and even to Australia. Accordingly, migration from 
the MENA region to the EU has become a major issue of 
domestic or internal security and of the intergovernmental 
policy coordination on justice and home affairs. Migration 
has already been a major driver for European initiatives, both 
in the framework of the European Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) of the Barcelona Process (BP) and of the new Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM). With the Frontex organization, 
the EU is handling migrants as an issue of border security. 
 Human Security, Environmental Confl ict 
and Climate Adaptation 
 Environmental Confl ict and Climate Security 
Risks 
 Global climate change can connect several regional chal-
lenges (pollution, desertifi cation, water scarcity, food insecu-
rity, population growth, unemployment, economic recession, 
urbanization, and political instability) and make them more 
severe. Whether and to which degree these developments 
will possibly trigger large-scale migration and violent con-
fl ict, not only depends on climate stress factors and human or 
socio-economic vulnerability, but also on adaptive problem- 
solving capabilities and policy decisions. 
 The linkages between natural resource scarcity, environ-
mental degradation, social stress and violent confl icts were 
analysed in the 1990s by the Toronto research group (Homer- 
Dixon  1991 ,  1994 ) and by the ENCOP project in Zürich 
(Bächler and Spillmann  1996 ; Bächler et al.  1996 ). Homer- 
Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory claims that environ-
mental scarcity may lead to violent confl ict when it is 
combined with population growth and unequal resource dis-
tribution. The concept of environmental stress was applied to 
land degradation and drought, but not systematically to cli-
mate change. 
 After a decade of research a consensus emerged that envi-
ronmental stress is rarely considered to be the sole or domi-
nant factor in precipitating confl ict within and between 
nations. A major effect of several types of environmental 
stress is economic decline that will affect the poor more than 
rich groups and countries. Environmental stress and rapid 
population growth contribute to soil degradation, internal 
displacement, socially precarious slum formation and larger- 
scale migration in life threatening conditions. A second path-
way from environmental stress to confl ict is through forced 
migration that may be caused by fl oods, droughts, loss of 
natural soil fertility, locusts or famine linked to deteriorated 
land. Additional related push factors are water and air pollu-
tion and deforestation due to lacking fuel wood. It is subject 
to research how these phenomena contribute to urban and 
rural violence, e.g. between nomads and peasants in the 
Sudano-Sahelian region. 
 While the environmental confl ict literature remained 
inconclusive, it received a new push with the discourse on the 
‘securitization’ of climate change that emerged since the pub-
lication of the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report. The main 
question in this debate is whether climate change could over-
whelm the adaptive capacities of societies and contribute to 
their destabilization, possibly leading to security risks and 
violent confl icts (for an overview see Brauch  2009 ; Brzoska 
 2009 ; Buhaug et al.  2008 ; Maas and Tänzler  2009 ; Webersik 
 2010 ; Scheffran and Battaglini  2011 ; Scheffran et al.  2012b ). 
There is an ongoing scientifi c debate on the climate-confl ict 
link. Several quantitative studies and data- bases provide 
empirical material together with statistical analysis to test 
hypotheses about relations between climatic variables (tem-
perature, precipitation) and confl ict-related variables (number 
of armed confl icts or casualties) (Barnett and Adger  2007 ; 
Nordås and Gleditsch  2007 ; Raleigh and Urdal  2007 ; 
Scheffran et al.  2012c ). Empirical studies do not provide a 
clear picture yet, which may be due to lack of data or the fact 
that the impact of climate has been weak in the past compared 
to what is expected for the future. The assessment of potential 
confl ict implications of climate change is complicated since 
it is still not possible to systematically and directly measure 
resource distribution or small scale violent events (such as 
riots). Increasing attention is being paid to data bases of 
low- level instability events (Nardulli and Leetaru  2012 ). 
 Climate Vulnerability and Impacts 
in the Mediterranean 
 The generic results have to be differentiated for the 
Mediterranean region that is affected by major interstate 
wars and low-level instability events (Pfetsch  2003 ), as well 
as by environmental degradation, resource scarcity, popula-
tion growth and low development that together could con-
tribute to confl ict. The impact of climate change on the 
Mediterranean region depends on its vulnerability which 
according to the IPCC ( 2007b ) “is a function of the charac-
ter, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to 
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive 
capacity”. Exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity vary 
signifi cantly in the region. 
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 There is so far no systematic and regionally integrated 
scientifi c assessment of the physical climate change impacts 
for the whole Mediterranean and especially for the MENA 
region. The report of the regional seminar of the Blue Plan 
on climate change in the Mediterranean (2008) addressed the 
impact on the environment and human health, most particu-
larly the vulnerability of Mediterranean coasts that are to 
take the more drastic sea level rise into account, on the 
migration of ecological niches and shift of invasive species 
in the Mediterranean, on the risks of spreading of infectious 
diseases and on the health impacts of heat waves. Another 
focus was on the discussion of the impact on natural 
resources, natural risks and anthropogenic activities (fi sher-
ies, tourism, agriculture, energy). 
 The UNEP-MAP ( 2009 ) analysis listed among the major 
climate change impacts “water availability, biodiversity and 
the economic activities on which they depend” and the impli-
cations of these projected changes on fi sheries, forest fi res, 
tourism and on human health. But both recent reports as well 
as the previous extensive studies of the Blue Plan (Grenon 
and Batisse  1989 ; Benoit and Comeau  2005 ) did not discuss 
the implications of climate change on crop yields and food 
production as well as on the declining self-suffi ciency rates 
in cereals for the MENA region countries (Brauch  2010 ). 
 A report on the environment and security in the southern 
Mediterranean region briefl y discussed the “pressures on 
water, agriculture, desertifi cation” but it did not meet the sys-
tematic requirements of an authoritative IPCC assessment 
(MEDSEC  2009 ). Regarding the physical impacts projected 
until 2020, 2050 and 2100, the IPCC Synthesis Report con-
cluded that “in southern Europe, climate change is projected 
to worsen conditions (high temperatures and drought) in a 
region already vulnerable to climate variability, and to reduce 
water availability, hydropower potential, summer tourism 
and, in general, crop productivity. Climate change is also 
projected to increase the health risks due to heat waves and 
the frequency of wildfi res” (IPCC  2007b ). The same report 
also noted that Africa will be most severely affected “because 
of low adaptive capacity and projected climate change 
impacts”. According to the IPCC assessment by 2020, 
“between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be 
exposed to increased water stress due to climate change”. In 
some countries, “yields from rain-fed agriculture could be 
reduced by up to 50 %”. 
 The physical and societal effects of climate change on 
the Mediterranean region may be analysed from different 
security perspectives: the national security of riparian 
Mediterranean countries, international and regional 
Mediterranean security, as well as human security for the 
affected human beings. Last not least, the above physical 
effects and impacts on societies produce also various 
environmental security impacts for the region, the states 
and the peoples. 
 In its implementation paper of the European Security 
Strategy (EU  2003 ) the 27 countries of the European Council 
concluded that “natural disasters, environmental degradation 
and competition for resources exacerbate confl ict, especially 
in situations of poverty and population growth, with humani-
tarian, health, political and security consequences, including 
greater migration” (EU  2008b ). This decision was based on 
a report of the High Representative and Commission pre-
sented in March 2008 “which described climate change as a 
‘threat multiplier’” (EU  2008a ). The European Council 
noted that “climate change can also lead to disputes over 
trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inac-
cessible” (EU  2008b ). 
 Climate Vulnerability and Confl ict 
in North Africa 
 A literature synopsis on regional security implications of cli-
mate change (Adelphi  2009 ) reviewed reports on six target 
regions in the Commission Report, of which the MENA 
region is of special interest: “Climate change is likely to 
worsen divisions, particularly those running along social 
divisions and unequal wealth distribution and resource 
access. Crisis events such as sudden food shortages may trig-
ger violent riots and – if left unaddressed – could destabilise 
states and increase public support for extremist groups offer-
ing viable alternatives. Given the geopolitical currents in 
MENA, this could have global repercussions.” This synopsis 
argued that “the two major sources of wealth, income and 
employment in the MENA region, oil and agriculture, will 
diminish,” and that “climate change will likely decrease agri-
cultural output due to heat stress and reduced available 
water”. The review sees a future security challenge “when 
the combination of converging climate and socio-economic 
trends will reach critical thresholds, catalysing processes that 
lead to state fragility”. Particular confl ict-prone are unre-
solved water disputes (Israel, Palestine; Nile river) and the 
high sensitivity to food price hikes which fuelled riots in 
MENA countries. 
 Due to increasing demand for food and water (driven by 
population growth) and the projected decline in agricultural 
productivity (driven by climate change), concerns have been 
raised about food and water security and its implications for 
confl ict in North Africa. Regarding the IPCC indicators for 
vulnerability, trends suggest an increasing climate change 
exposure, a signifi cant sensitivity and limited adaptation 
capacities which make the region particularly vulnerable to 
climate change (Schilling et al.  2010 ,  2012 ). Due to its high 
dependency on rain-fed agriculture (except for Egypt) the 
region is very sensitive to reduction in precipitation. Morocco 
is seen as the most vulnerable state in North Africa, due to 
the combination of high climate exposure, low generic 
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adaptive capacity and high sensitivity (Yohe et al.  2006 ; 
Sullivan and Huntingford  2009 ; Iglesias et al.  2009 ). Social 
stability has already been affected by past droughts, and 
future droughts additionally have the potential to increase 
social inequality, and threaten social stability by severe 
shocks in food prices. Climate change is likely to cause a 
decrease in primary agricultural production in Morocco 
which already has low per capita income, an indicator for 
confl ict sensitivity (Collier  2007 ). 
 The high vulnerability to climate change could contribute 
to social instability and violent confl ict, in addition to factors 
such as ethnic diversity and political marginalization. 
Algeria, Egypt and Libya have experienced several confl icts 
in the recent two decades. Some authors see a “potential for 
more pronounced water confl icts of neighbouring countries” 
in North Africa (Iglesias et al.  2010 ), and a high risk of polit-
ical instability or armed confl ict as a knock-on consequence 
of climate change for Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco 
(Smith and Vivekananda  2007 ). 
 Adaptive Capacities in the Mediterranean 
 In the Mediterranean region there are signifi cant differ-
ences in adaptive capacities (WBGU  2008 ; Brauch  2007 ). 
Southern Europe is characterized by relatively high eco-
nomic and social capabilities. Countries are consolidated 
democracies with largely functioning governance mecha-
nisms, market economy structures, social security net-
works and supranational equalization systems (e.g. 
European Structural Funds). There is rather developed 
know-how, resources and technical capabilities to handle 
drought or fl ooding. Individual risks can be diminished 
through private insurance and further supported through 
European subsidies, e.g. the European Disaster Relief 
Fund. Adaptive capacities can be further backed up by 
support from the EU to mitigate the impact, strengthen 
long-term adaptation and resolve confl ict. Despite 
expected environmental changes, outbreaks of violence 
and confl ict are less likely in the foreseeable future. The 
economic crisis in some of the South European countries 
challenges the stability of the region as well as the man-
agement capabilities of the EU. 
 In contrast, the MENA countries are highly vulnerable, 
have low adaptive capacities and signifi cant confl icts (Pfetsch 
 2003 ; Brauch  2007 ). In North Africa climate change inter-
acts with the region’s other problems that involve high popu-
lation growth and unemployment, large social discrepancies, 
dependence on agriculture, unsustainable agricultural prac-
tices, weak governance and institutional structures (Schilling 
et al.  2010 ). The signifi cant challenges posed by climate 
change increase the importance of major political reforms 
and socio-economic adaptation measures which have to 
address the specifi c elements of exposure and sensitivity to 
effi ciently reduce vulnerability. The adaptive capacity of a 
society can be divided into generic indicators such as educa-
tion, income and health, and impact specifi c indicators that 
relate to institutions, knowledge and technology (IPCC 
 2007b ). 
 The adaptive capacities of the North African states are 
lower than in Europe but higher compared to the average 
of the African continent. Low per capita income and its 
unequal distribution (most unequal in Morocco and 
Tunisia) limit the generic adaptive capacity while the high 
level of corruption is a general weakness of the impact 
specifi c adaptive capacity (Schilling et al.  2012 ). The per-
centage of undernourished population has not been criti-
cal over the past 20 years (FAO  2010a ,  b ), although 
low-income groups are sensitive to food price increases. 
Morocco performs poorest in economic resources, human 
development, health and education, while economic and 
development indicators are strongest in Egypt and Libya 
(UNDP  2011 ). Regarding the impact-specifi c adaptive 
capacity widespread corruption limits the effi cient use of 
economic assets to cope with the effects of climate change 
(Transparency International  2011 ). The level of knowl-
edge, technology and foreign investment in North Africa 
is signifi cantly higher than in the rest of Africa (Schilling 
et al.  2012 ). 
 Adequate policies are needed to diminish the risk that 
climate change contributes to social inequality and insta-
bility in North Africa. A continued mismanagement of 
soil quality, rangeland vegetation and groundwater deple-
tion amplifi es the impacts of climate change. Examples 
are the cropping of marginal lands, irrigation from fossil 
groundwater and the growing of wheat instead of the 
 traditionally used barley. There is a variety of options for 
adaptation to climate change available in agriculture that 
focus on conservation of productive assets instead of 
depleting them to maximize present day output (Schilling 
et al.  2012 ). In order to take advantage of the full spec-
trum of innovations for sustainable agriculture it is neces-
sary to have strong monitoring mechanisms that include 
local and specifi c knowledge. Examples are the shifting of 
planting patterns and adjusting of planted crops in rain fed 
agriculture, a better monitoring of irrigation practices and 
soil conditions, area based rainfall insurances, as well as 
improvement of seasonal weather predictions. Further 
options include commercial pastoralism and replacement 
of fi rewood by solar power which creates new job oppor-
tunities and mitigates climate change (Schilling et al. 
 2012 ; Freier et al.  2011 ,  2012 ). Some of these issues are 
addressed in new agricultural strategies, for instance 
Morocco’s “Plan Maroc Vert” (Maroc  2011 ). To strengthen 
adaptive capacities of poorer parts of the population, fur-
ther measures are required to balance social inequalities. 
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 Energy Security as Field of Confl ict 
and Cooperation 
 Confl ict Dimensions of Fossil and Nuclear 
Energy 
 Like other parts of the world, the Mediterranean region is 
still heavily dependent on fossil fuels, in particular oil and 
natural gas. MENA countries, especially Libya, Algeria, 
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries, are rich in these resources and much of 
its wealth is built on fossil fuel exports, at the cost of a 
strong dependence of the world on fossil fuels from MENA. 
In the past, this dependence has contributed to a number of 
violent confl icts that absorbed signifi cant amounts of the 
region’s resources for military purposes and caused environ-
mental damage. The oil and gas revenues were partly used to 
ensure access to water (e.g. through desalinization plants) 
and to food imports (‘virtual water’). By mid-century the 
reserves of oil and gas are projected to decline or to be 
exhausted in some countries (Mason and Kumetat  2011 ). 
 So far, nuclear power was limited to a few countries in 
Southern Europe (France, Spain, Slovenia) and discussions 
in the MENA region (in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Turkey and in Israel). In this confl ict-prone region the dual 
potential of nuclear energy for military purposes has 
increased mutual threat perceptions and has become an addi-
tional driver of confl ict, as in the case of Iraq and more 
recently Iran (Kubbig and Fikenscher  2012 ). A number of 
countries in MENA aim for access to nuclear power as a low- 
carbon energy alternative to fossil fuels, which could further 
increase the threat of nuclear proliferation. 
 Renewable Energy Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean: A Contribution to Energy 
Security and Climate Protection 
 Due to its high solar input, the Mediterranean region has sig-
nifi cant renewable energy resources. While in Southern 
Europe the full range of renewables is accessible (including 
hydropower, bioenergy, wind, solar and geothermal), the 
most promising resource in the MENA region is solar power, 
with some wind power potential in mountain and coastal 
areas (see the overview in Mason and Kumetat  2011 ). A 
strong cooperation between Europe, North Africa and the 
Middle East on energy security and climate security could 
highly benefi t the entire region, increase adaptive capacity, 
substantially contribute to emission reduction, especially in 
the power sector, and improve the conditions for long term 
stability. An opportunity for strengthened cooperation 
between Europe and MENA is the vision of connecting 
renewable energy systems by an electric power grid for high- 
voltage direct-current transmission (Nitsch and Staiß  1997 ; 
Brauch  1997 ,  2012 ; Czisch and Giebel  2007 ; Trieb et al. 
 2009 ; IPCC  2011 ). The DESERTEC concept offers a policy 
vision for a sustainable supply of electricity for both the 
MENA region and Europe. 
 Producing a large quantity of electricity from renewable 
sources in the Mediterranean region offers a number of ben-
efi ts: to prevent climate change and meet the emission 
reduction and renewable energy obligations of the whole 
region, decrease energy dependency from fossil fuels and 
engage the whole EU-MENA region in close cooperation on 
renewable energy. North African countries see the opportu-
nity to meet the increasing local energy demand, to attract 
substantial foreign investments, generate export benefi ts 
and open the way to technology sharing, income and 
employment opportunities. Before such a project can be 
realized, a number of hurdles and criteria need to be 
addressed and sustainability criteria are to be developed 
(Klawitter  2010 ; Abaza et al.  2011 ). 
 Two strategies have been launched since 2008: (a) the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) within the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) that was launched in Paris in 14 July 
2008, and (b) the Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii) that was 
announced in Munich a year later on 14 July 2009. The 
cooperative renewable energy concept for the MENA has 
been promoted by the Club of Rome and developed further 
by the DESERTEC Foundation in Hamburg. The DESERTEC 
White Book “describes a scenario of electricity demand and 
supply opportunities by renewable energy in the integrated 
EUMENA region up to the middle of the century, and confi rms 
the importance of international cooperation to achieve 
economic and environmental sustainability.” 5 The DESERTEC 
Foundation is to contribute to the realization of this concept 
and works “for creating a global alliance to ensure security 
of energy supplies, to promote economic development, and 
to stabilize the world’s climate”. 
 The Dii pursues the goal “to analyse and develop the 
technical, economic, political, social and ecological frame-
work for carbon-free power generation in the deserts of 
North Africa.” The aim is to produce suffi cient power to 
meet around 15 % of Europe’s electricity requirements and a 
substantial portion of the power needs of the producer coun-
tries. The Dii plans to cooperate closely with the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) which could serve as a 
policy framework for the development of DESERTEC. 6 On 
3 November 2010 the DESERTEC Foundation together with 
5 
 See summary of the DESERTEC project; at:  http://www.desertec.org/
en/concept/summary/ 
6 
 See 30 October 2009, Press release, “Joint venture DII established 
and ready to take up work”; at:  http://www.desertec.org/en/press/
press-releases/091030-01-formation-dii-gmbh/ 
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18 universities and research facilities launched a DESERTEC 
university network. Both initiatives (MSP and Dii) could 
serve as conceptual components of a far more ambitious 
 EU-MENA Survival Pact that links together two essential 
commodities: food or ‘virtual water’ and sustainable solar 
energy or ‘virtual sun’ (Brauch  2002b ,  2010 ,  2012 ). 
 Besides business opportunities for the companies, there 
are other economic, ecological and social potentials: (a) 
greater energy security in the EU and MENA countries; (b) 
growth and development opportunities for the MENA region 
as a result of substantial private investment; (c) safeguarding 
the future water supply in the MENA countries by utilizing 
excess energy in seawater desalinization plants; and (d) 
reducing CO 2 emissions and thus making a signifi cant con-
tribution to achieving the climate change targets of the EU 
up to 2020 and 2050 (Energy Roadmap EU  2011 ). 7 
 Given the policy implications of the emerging outcomes 
of the Arab Spring, a major initiative needs to be launched by 
the respective countries with support of the EU, to create in 
the medium term new and additional jobs and national 
income. This requires major advances to improve the scien-
tifi c, technological and administrative knowledge base to 
overcome the defi cits the Arab Human Development reports 
have stressed. Thus, the Desertec concept is no panacea to 
address the short-term dissatisfaction of the Arab youth, but 
it can become a major component of a longer-term Trans- 
Mediterranean sustainable co-development starting with the 
energy sector, and materializing the green growth potentials 
the Arab Forum on Environment and Development (Abaza 
et al.  2011 ) has addressed. 
 Political and Economic Frameworks 
for Cooperation in the Mediterranean 
 To prevent the security risks in the Mediterranean, it is nec-
essary to address the new challenges in a multilateral and 
cooperative way to match the asymmetric distribution of 
risks and adaptive capacities. Yet the region suffers from a 
lack of cooperation, and attempts for a stronger integration 
and institutionalization remained with minor success. A 
number of Mediterranean dialogues coexist with little inter-
action, at the Euromed, NATO and OSCE level (Brauch 
 2010 ). It should therefore be a priority for the European 
institutions to promote deeper cooperation in assessing cli-
mate change and its impacts, as well as in the fi eld of renew-
able energies. A  Mediterranean and Human Security 
Initiative (MEH-SEC) would allow a balanced economic co- 
development across the Mediterranean, especially in the 
agricultural and energy sectors (Brauch  2010 ,  2012 ). To 
overcome these concerns, institutional frameworks for coop-
eration are needed to mitigate the impacts and strengthen 
long-term adaptation that reduce the likelihood of violent 
confl ict. 
 Concerns about the security risks of climate change have 
not yet been mainstreamed into the eight priority projects of 
the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). During the third 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the environ-
ment on 20 November 2006, its Cairo Declaration only once 
referred to climate change welcoming an EU initiative for a 
“Communication establishing an environment strategy for 
the Mediterranean that outlines the approach of the European 
Commission regarding its environmental cooperation in the 
region for the coming years across a range of sectors such as 
climate change, desertifi cation and biodiversity.” 
 EU’s environmental policy for the Mediterranean in the 
framework of activities of Horizon 2020 has among its 
four key priorities: (a) projects to reduce the most signifi -
cant pollution sources; (b) capacity-building measures to 
help neighbouring countries create national environmen-
tal administrations; (c) using the Commission’s research 
budget to develop and share knowledge of environmental 
issues; and (d) developing indicators to monitor the suc-
cess of Horizon 2020. Climate change has not been spe-
cifi cally emphasized. The timetable of Horizon 2020 for 
the fi rst phase (2007–2013) does not even once refer to 
climate change. 
 The “Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament – Establishing an 
Environment Strategy for the Mediterranean” (SEC  2006 ) 
referred to climate change in the framework of ongoing 
and completed research under the 5th and 6th Research 
Framework Programmes “addressing water issues under 
the EU Water Initiative’s Mediterranean component and 
those covering accidental marine pollution, marine and 
coastal research and climate change impacts.” Furthermore, 
“global environmental threats such as climate change and 
biodiversity loss” are identifi ed in this Communication 
within a thematic programme for sustainable management 
of natural resources. 
 While Mediterranean climate change impacts have been 
so far no major concern of EU environment policy, the dis-
cussion on security implications of climate change in the 
Euro-Mediterranean region have increasingly become a 
concern for the DG on External Relations that launched the 
EU roadmap process on the security impacts of climate 
change. 
 In the security realm, several security–related dialogues 
have emerged: (a) the Euro-Arab dialogue of EC and Arab 
League states since 1973; (b) the CSCE/OSCE Mediterranean 
partners for cooperation since 1975; (c) the French initiative 
for a 5 + 5 dialogue of 1990; (d) the Egyptian proposal of 1994 
7 
 Press release, Munich, 13 Jul 2009: “12 companies plan establishment 
of a Desertec Industrial Initiative”; at  http://www.desertec.org/fi lead-
min/downloads/press/09-07-13_PM_DII_english.pdf 
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for a Mediterranean Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation, 
(e) the WEU Mediterranean Subgroup that has ended, and (f) 
the NATO Mediterranean Initiative of 1994 (de Santis  2003 ) 
and since 2004 the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (Bin 
 2008 ). In early 2012, still three of these Mediterranean secu-
rity dialogues have co-existed without coordination: (a) the 
OSCE with its  Mediterranean partners for cooperation 
(MPCs); (b) NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue with the 
Mediterranean Cooperation Group; (c) and the  Barcelona 
process aiming at a  Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) 
launched in November 1995 and reinvigorated as the UfM in 
2008. After the transfer of the WEU’s operational activities to 
the EU, the WEU Assembly has acted as the interim European 
Security and Defence Assembly 8 providing a forum for politi-
cal discussion and refl ection on the  European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). 
 The  Barcelona Declaration of 1995 establishing a  Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its successor the 
 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) are the only multi-issue 
regimes in the making covering most Mediterranean ripari-
ans and MENA countries. It is the only politically relevant 
forum for an increasing pan-Mediterranean functional coop-
eration on the three baskets aiming at (a) a security partner-
ship, (b) an economic and fi nancial partnership, and (c) a 
partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. 
 While the ‘space’ of the  Barcelona Convention (1976) has 
focused on riparian nations to protect the Mediterranean Sea 
( environmental space ), the  Barcelona Declaration (1995) 
relies on a larger Euro-Mediterranean space as common area 
of peace and stability, of shared prosperity and of understand-
ing between cultures and exchanges between civil societies 
( political space ). While this environmental space remained 
unchanged, the political space has signifi cantly changed due 
to EU enlargement and the emergence of the UfM. The 
‘Mediterranean space’ used by international organizations, 
regimes and dialogues depends on their goals given the lack 
of commonly accepted geographic and political criteria. 
 Only the European Union has the resources to deal with 
the long-term environmental challenges the southern and 
eastern shores have experienced since 1950 and will be con-
fronted with in the twenty-fi rst century. To cope with these 
non-military challenges in the Mediterranean, close political 
and economic cooperation becomes crucial. The EMP part-
nership and the UfM offer a political institution where 
competence, legitimacy and resources are present. Modest 
funding for environmental projects in the Mediterranean has 
been granted by UN agencies and programmes (UNESCO, 
ECE, ECA, ESCWA, UNEP, UNDP), and by international 
fi nancial institutions. Since 1995, major funding for joint 
environmental activities has been provided by the European 
Union within the EMP of the Barcelona Process and by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
 Between the environmental regimes and the security dia-
logues there was little political cooperation. With the  Athens 
Declaration a closer cooperation between SMAP and MAP 
and synergies with other organizations, programmes 
(Mediterranean Action Programme MAP) and donors 
(Mediterranean Technical Assistance Programme METAP) 
were encouraged. The Blue Plan secretariat has also anal-
ysed many environmental challenges of the twenty-fi rst 
century for the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable 
Development (MCSD). At the  intergovernmental level and 
in the  EuroMesco network 9 there has been no conceptual 
debate on environmental security issues in the Mediterranean 
until MEDSEC was proposed during 2009. 
 Due to the unresolved Middle East confl ict a major break-
through in the Barcelona process and in the UfM remained 
stalled. In 2010 the UfM experienced severe setbacks with the 
postponement of the second summit of the heads of state. But 
the functional cooperation continued with the establishment 
of a UfM secretariat in Barcelona in 2011. The UfM builds on 
the achievements of the Barcelona Process whose goals and 
cooperation areas (political dialogue, economic cooperation 
and free trade, and human, social and cultural dialogue) 
remain valid. The UfM enhances the Barcelona Process by 
(a) upgrading the political level of the relationship; (b) rein-
forcing co-ownership with a system of co- presidencies with a 
Secretariat and a Joint Permanent Committee; (c) making 
these relations more concrete and visible. At the Paris Summit 
among the six adopted priority projects two are of direct rel-
evance for achieving sustainable development solutions 
focusing on (a) a de-pollution of the Mediterranean; and (b) 
on alternative energies within the MSP. 
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